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Rethinking Radical Politics and Ethics
Some Badiouian Perspectives by Way of Žižek
Han-yu Huang
1 As a living exemplification of his own notions of subtraction and universal singularity,
Badiou’s work as a whole does not fit in any contemporary movement, trend and school
of  thought  (Hallward,  Badiou xi;  Hewlett  26),  the  situations  with  which  he  actively,
critically engages. The multiple, hypertextual relations he establishes with and among
other  thinkers  and writers,  be  they  ancient,  modern or  postmodern,  stand out  as  a
singular case. First of all, his return to the ontological question since time immemorial
“how can something new come into being?” brings  together  theories  of  the subject,
event, being and truth by Plato, St Paul, Pascal, Rousseau, Mallarme, Cantor, Althusser,
Lacan,  Deleuze,  and so on,  to  a  new confrontation of  discourses.  In many occasions,
Badiou explicitly delineates the influences he receives but at the same time is eager to
highlight his minimal difference with them. For example, Badiou positions his theory of the
subject  in  relation  to,  rather  than  in  direct  continuity  with,  Sartre  and  Lacan,  as  both
contribute to an immanentized, denaturalized notion of the subject: “In my own doctrine,
the subject is dependent on an event and only comes to be constituted as a capacity for
truth” and is able to dissolve itself  into a project that exceeds itself  to “attain some
subjective  real”  (Century 100-01). 1 Some critics,  though recognizing Badiou’s  singular
position in contemporary theoretical scene, relegate the multiple relations, influences
and differences  at  issue  here  to  a  more  or  less  definite  discursive  formation.  Oliver
Marchart  coins  “post-foundational  political  thought”  to  label  the  set  with  Schmitt,
Ricoeur,  Wolin,  Rancière,  Nancy,  Badiou and Mouffe as  its  members,  whose theories,
though with different predicates, share the same concerns for the split of politics and the
political and the impossibility of the final ground of politics (7). Likewise, Nick Hewlett
places Badiou together with Balibar and Rancière within the tradition of emancipatory
politics in modern French thought (9-17), which has its counterpart in a more recent
renewal of interest in left-oriented thought with a variety of different advocates like
Hardt and Negri, Harvey, Jameson, and Žižek (Hewlett 6-7).
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2 If,  as  presented  above,  very  few  can  match  Badiou’s  singular  intervention  in
contemporary thought through his multiple relations with other thinkers and theorists
regarding the ontological (re)turn to the subject, Truth and radical politics, still fewer
stand  diametrically  against  so  many  philosophical,  social,  cultural,  political  and
ideological  trends as  Badiou does.  Badiou’s  subject-oriented thought and faith in the
universal  Truth-Event  mark  a  radical  disagreement  with  his  postmodern French
contemporaries like Derrida and Lyotard, whose alignments may be traced back to the
linguistic tern, analytic philosophy and hermeneutic tradition, altogether coming down
to postmodern cultural,  historical relativism and skepticism (Badiou, SP 6).  Moreover,
Badiou places the derogatory labels like ethical ideology and animal humanism on the turn
to (bio)ethics in contemporary French philosophy and Anglo-American cultural criticism,
the  ethics  oriented  to  the  recognition  of  differences  and  the  Other  but  victimizing,
reducing human to the status of passive, fragile animality (Badiou, C 175, E 10-16, LW 2, SP
6; Hallward, “Translator’s Introduction,” E xiii). Such ethics for Badiou betrays not only “a
symptom of a more general nihilism” (Critchley, Infinitely Demanding 42) but also the false,
empty universality as is  manifested in capitalist  financial  globalization and monetary
abstraction (SP 6-7). The latter doubles the “fragmentation into closed identities” (SP 10);
put in more concrete terms, the assertion and invention of new identities perfectly fits in
capitalist logic. In Badiou’s own words :
Capital  demands a permanent creation of  subjective and territorial  identities  in
order for its principle of movement to homogenize its space of action; identities,
moreover, that never demand anything but the right to be exposed in the same way
as others to the uniform prerogatives  of  the market.  The capitalist  logic  of  the
general  equivalent  and  the  identitarian  and  cultural  logic  of  communities  or
minorities from an articulated whole. (SP 10-11)
3 A critique like this is characterized with Badiou’s defense for a singular position against
contemporary  ethics  and  identity  politics  and  his  denial  of  any  possibility  of  the
authentic universal Truth-Event to them. At this point, we are tempted to ask if Badiou’s
equation of  the capitalist  logic with the cultural  logic of  identity politics  implies his
conception of  the  former  as  impeccable  and the  latter  as  hopeless.  If  contemporary
identity politics, cultural, ethnic or national, fails to break with the capitalist logic, can
Badiouian  politics  make  it,  a  politics  outside  the  State,  as  is  emphatically  declared
throughout his work, and capitalist system too? Do all types of identity politics equally
demand to be recognized by the Other and counted in the same way? Or, fundamentally,
in what way does Badiou open up for the political subject a Truth-Event beyond the state
of contemporary politics and ethics, and in what way does he not turn out to be the object
of his critiques?
4 To grapple  with the  above  complications,  and to  position Badiou’s  intervention into
contemporary thought in general and ethico-political theory in particular, we first need
to examine his ontological formulations of the event, truth, and subject. In fact, the title
of Badiou’s magnum opus, Being and Event, condenses an essential understanding of what
are at issue here: namely, an ontological order of Being, of “being-qua-being” with its
Other, “what-is-not-being-qua-being.” The “and” designates a Two that resists dialectical
synthesis (Badiou, C 109). Whereas being belongs to the positivized ontological order of
knowledge imposed on the multiplicities of being – hence, the consistent multiplicity of
multiplicities –  an event  brings  a  new subject  and truth into  existence:  an event,  in
Badiou’s own words, marks a point of rupture at which “the ontological field is
detotalized or  caught  in an impasse” (TW 100).  However,  Badiou cautions  us  against
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lapsing into an “obscurantist theory of creation ex nihilo” and equating an event qua a
deontoligizing rupture with a miracle: as he accentuates, an event is always localized in
particular situations but at the same time is subtracted from the state of situations (the
consistent multiplicity of multiplicities). This does not follow that all situations equally
allow for an event to happen. Rather, the eventual site – namely, the singular point from
which an event happens – must be “on the edge of the void” (BE 175, TW 101), but not vice
versa, since the state is always there quick to manipulate, to fill in the void in question.
Accordingly, an authentic event, as is hazardous and unpredictable, always constitutes a
political, ethical issue. It demands an act of faith (Critchley, Infinitely Demanding 46) and
an “interpreting intervention” (the act of naming) from a “subjectively engaged position”
(Žižek, The Ticklish Subject 135);2 it differs from its semblance – in other words, a pseudo-
event – in that the latter reinforces rather than undermines, disrupts the status quo. It’s
exactly such a subjectively engaged act of interpretation and naming that opens up the
truth procedure.
5 The subject’s act in question here has nothing to do with validating any empirical fact,
logical  proposition  or  metaphysical  speculation.  “Truth”  happens  to  and  seizes  the
subject in the process of being true, namely, fidelity to an event (Badiou, E 42; Critchley,
Infinitely Demanding 43). The truth procedure, as well as the event that ignites it, creates
an  immanent  break  with  the  immediate  situation  and  a  “minimal,  albeit  absolute
difference… between the place and what takes place in the place, the difference between
place and taking-place” (Badiou, C 56). Being thus subjective, subtractive and disruptive,
the truth procedure also deviates from the “encyclopedia of knowledge” (Badiou, E lvii)
or  “the instituted knowledges of  the situation” (E 43):  it  resists  being allocated to a
definite  part  of  the  general  system  of  predicative  knowledge.  In  other  words,  the
procedure  at  stake  subtracts  truth,  its  infinite  valence,  from  and  in  excess  of  the
predicative constructions of language. A truth procedure, in Badiouian terms, presents a
pure generic multiple.3
6 Badiou’s ontological formulations of the event, truth and subject as presented above also
apply  to  his  political  theory,  which  subtracts  itself  from  almost  all  the  dominant
democratic  principles  such  as  representation,  consensus,  pluralism,  and  so  on,  and
opposes, on a more empirical level, to contemporary politics of human rights and identity
politics as such; identitarian markers like the Aryan, the Jew, the German… for Badiou are
all “mystical referential entities” and “the passive body of subjectiviation” (C 103). Put in
summarily explicit terms, Badiouian politics, as is singular, momentous and ephemeral,
radically intervenes in and prescribes a rupture with what exists (M 24).
7 A political event, first of all, always takes place in a disruptive relation with the state of
the  situation,  the  metastructure  that  sets  a  limit  on  the  ontological  infinity  of  the
situation and “[exercises] the power of counting over all the subsets of the situation” (M
143). The tension between the situation and the state of situation at issue here doubles
the one between the presentation of multiplicities and the representation of consistent
multiplicities.  And  a  political  event,  as  a  vanishing  mediator,  clears  the  ground  for
imposing a measure to the measureless, excessive and errant superpower of the State,
putting it at a distance, and freeing the multiplicities of situation (M 145). Meanwhile, a
political event is collective, neither in the sense of numericality – namely, not susceptible
to counting – nor of any common destiny and monumental history (M 97), but in a virtual
summoning of all subjects as the militants of truth, who resist conceptual, identitarian
categorizations (M 142) or who subtract themselves from the system of counting as well.
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However, all these emancipatory possibilities are yet to be realized by the post-evental
truth procedure. Put in Badiou’s mathematical terms, the State, as can be seen as a mega-
calculator,  governs  the  situation  – hence,  the  consistent  multiplicities –  by  way  of
organizing  the  latter’s  repetitive  numerical  seriality  and,  therefore,  maintaining  the
stability and unity of count. In a radical break with all this, a truth procedure does not
demand a non-part, an uncounted social member to be counted or a subjugated voice or
identity to be recognized as in identity politics as such; such demands, grounded in the
principle of difference, will only end up with a complicity with the status quo, the state of
situation. In contrast, a truth procedure disrupts the repetition, stability and unity of
count and changes the law of counting (Badiou, SP 11); it is only in so doing that radical,
authentic equality can be set in motion,  “each and every singularity is  to be treated
collectively and identically,” and the Same, rather than Difference, produced (Badiou, M
150). A truth procedure, ultimately, proceeds from setting a measure to the excessive
superpower of the State and liberating the infinity of the situation, which Badiou notates
as π(ε), to prescribing equality and sameness, π (π(ε)→1 (M 151-52), “whereby each and
every singularity is to be treated collectively and identically” (M 150). 
8 It should be clear by now that the subject relates to truth not as immobile knowledge of
contemplation but in the form of intervention and encounter. As Žižek explicates, “Truth
is not inherent, it is not the (re)discovery of what is already in myself, but an Event,
something violently imposed on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that
shatters the very foundations of my being” (TS 212). And as indicated above, the subject’s
intervention in the truth procedure, namely, its recognition of a multiple as an event,
demands an act of faith, and Badiou, in following Pascal, famously compares this act to
wagering, both of which are, in Bensaïd’s words, “irreducible to the dogmatic certainties
of  positive  science as  well  as  to  the  fickle  whims of  public  opinion” (99)  and,  more
fundamentally,  subtract  the  subject  from  its  immersed,  embedded  life  within  a
community (Bryant 14; Dews 110). Such understanding also pertains to Badiou’s reading
of  St  Paul  and his  followers,  who are “subjects  without identity” or  “non-parts” not
attached to any national, ethnic and cultural markers. The Resurrection as a pure Truth-
Event for them is neither demonstrable nor falsifiable and, in other words, does not “fall
under the remit of knowledge” (Badiou, SP 45); it is affirmed not in the form of witnessing
and memory but in terms of subjective disposition: namely, the subject’s fidelity. Thus
said, however, we should keep in mind that Badiou does not conceptualize the subject
exclusively as the subject faithful to the event, as he is well aware of the possibility that
an event may lead to reactionary effects (E lvii). The Badiouian subject never ceases to
think, investigate the situation and to actualize the immanent and continuing break from
the point of the event (E 67). The fidelity in question, therefore, concerns not only wager
but  also  more  or  less  consistent  political,  ethical  character.  This  does  not  have  any
implication  of  foolhardy  pertinacity  but  the  certainty  that  “the  subjective  will  can
realize… unheard-of possibilities… [and] intimately touches on the real” (C 99). In the last
analysis,  the subject’s  encounter with the Real,  as well  as with the generic (which is
subtracted from any trace of embedded particularity), constitutes the ground of Badiou’s
model of the ethical.
9 As  pointed  out  above,  few  in  contemporary  theoretical  scene  can  singularize  their
positions through critically maintaining such multiple relations with other thinkers and
theorists as Badiou does, and still fewer concepts arouse so many critical responses as the
Truth-Event, as is Badiou’s antidote to contemporary depoliticized world and functions as
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the point of the Real that eludes full symbolization but, at the same time, holds together
his  philosophical  system,  radical  egalitarian  politics,  and  militant  ethical-political
subjectivity, as well as all those Badiouian signature concepts like the generic, universal
singularity, subtraction, fidelity and so on. Critics of Badiou tend to raise the doubt that
Badiouian politics of Truth-Event is detached from actual historical, material conditions,
fails to account for the “pre-evental” triggers, address compromise, strategy and realism
and  provide  any  criteria  for  ethical,  political  choice,  all  owing  to  his  mathematical
ontology dominated by the dualistic distinction between the event and situation (Bensaïd
101; Gillespie 180; Hewlett 41; Johnston 15; Laclau 129; Marchart 130). Such criticisms,
though not unreasonable, may lose their credibility and even become pointless if they fail
to address the split between politics and the political; they may sound like calling for
“returning to the basic” and seem to posit objective ontic realities as always already
there: fundamental, radical antagonism may be thus downplayed and the status quo (of
liberal democracy) remains intact. With a view to a model of the political that aims to
break  with  the  politics  of  status  quo,  namely,  the  dominant  liberal-democratic,
multiculturalist  politics  and  ethics,  and  to  realize  radical  equality,  the  problem  of
Badiou’s universalizing project does not lie in subtraction as such – subtraction from the
situation,  political  realism, strategic calculation,  “encyclopedia of  knowledge,” and so
on – but in how to radicalize authentic subtractive politics of Truth-Event. In this aspect,
Badiou prescribes local struggles subtracted from but against the State with the aim to fix,
even subvert the latter in the long run, and Maoist and Bolshevik politics always stay on
Badiou’s list of model politics. We may be thus tempted to suspect that Badiou is seduced
by past great politics and runs the risk of nostalgically blinding himself to the micro-
political struggles of the present (Critchley, “On the Ethics” 234). 
10 In many aspects other than the one illustrated right above, Badiou’s blindness has self-
subtraction as  its  variation:  the exact  status  of  the Truth-Event,  to  a  certain extent,
evades Badiou’s theoretical edifice, which appears to be a living, albeit somewhat ironic,
exemplification  of  subtraction.  To  be  more  specific,  an  Event,  and  its  gap  with  the
positive order of Being, does not emerge in itself; it demands the subjectively engaged act
of naming: in other words, it is a retroactive construct, and its seizure of and effect on the
subject – so to speak, the subject’s fidelity to a Truth-Event – are thus indistinguishable
from ideological interpellation (Žižek, “Psychoanalysis” 244-45, TS 141). Moreover, Badiou
elevates Christ’s resurrection, which belongs to Christian religion, to the status of the
Truth-Event par excellence, while religion, as the prototype of ideology, is not counted in
his four realms of the Truth-Event – namely, love, art, science and politics. 
11 As illustrated above, Badiou’s unknowing or unknowing subtractions of the Truth-Event
from his  own theoretical  edifice,  to  a  great  extent,  preclude him from realizing the
authentic, radical politics and ethics according to his own formulations. The same also
holds for his opposition of the Truth-Event to death drive. When Badiou in Saint Paul
addresses the entanglement of the Law and the transgressive desire, he sees the latter as
a repetitive automatism that is initiated by the former and brings the subject to the site
of  sin  and  death:  in  Badiou’s  own  words,  “There  is  transgression  when  what  is
prohibited… becomes the object of a desire that lives through itself in the site and place
of the subject” (SP 79). And it is through grace, “the capacity of a postevental multiplicity
to exceed its own limit” (SP 78), that the subject breaks with the entanglement or vicious
circle  in question.  Thus said,  we are tempted to question how exactly the subject  is
brought from the automatism of desire,  which leads to sin and death, to postevental
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excess, gratuitousness of grace. Does what “lives through itself” in the subject only seek
for the prohibited object and transgression? Is it possible that the subject desires what it
does not desire or a transgression of all transgressions too, since desire for Badiou works
through a repetitive automatism? Do these questions not bring us the psychoanalytic
understanding that desire is, and so is the subject, split in itself and in excess of itself? 
12 If we see the opposition of the Truth-Event to the death drive as the weakest in Badiou,
such weakness, according to Bosteels, can be overcome by “radically acknowledging the
role of the death drive as a missing third term, or a ‘vanishing mediator’, between Being
and Event” (230). The death drive, to a great extent, holds the key to the above questions.
The  death  drive  according  to  psychoanalytic  formulations  disregards  all  utilitarian
considerations and goes beyond the reality and pleasure principle, persists, lives through
in  excess  of  itself  and,  hence,  disrupts  the  closure,  homeostasis  of  the  positive
(ontological, epistemological, or communitarian) order. The Badiouian subject, as pointed
out  above,  realizes  “unheard-of  possibilities”  through  its  fidelity  to  the event  and
encounter, touches on the real. To radicalize his ethico-political theory, therefore, Badiou
has no reason to evade the ethical dimension of drive and jouissance. In neglecting this
dimension, he also misses the fact that the death drive in psychoanalysis designates the
excess, rather than privation, of life that persists beyond the corporeal, earthly “cycle of
life and death, of generation and corruption” (Žižek, DLC 395). Badiou may need to learn
“the ultimate lesson of psychoanalysis”, according to Žižek’s explication, that “human life
is never ‘just life’: humans are not simply alive, they are possessed by the strange drive to
enjoy life to excess, passionately attached to a surplus which sticks out and derails the
ordinary run of  things” (DLC 395).  Does the Christ-Event not  perfectly exemplify the
psychoanalytic-ethical lesson in question here? 
13 The entanglement of the law and transgressive desire that Badiou addresses, albeit with
his  failure  to  conceptualize  the  spectrality  of  (in)human  life  and  drive,  pertains  to
contemporary society of enjoyment, and it is at this juncture that we once again see the
significance of psychoanalytic ethics, the sole theory that sets out to deliver the subject
out  of  the  difficulty  of  desiring  and  enslavement  by  the  ferocious  superego.
Contemporary consumers are offered an excessive array of commodity to choose from.
Life styles, sexual pleasures, cultural identities, spiritualities, fantasies however obscene
or perverse… all  turn out to be the objects  for mass transgressive consumption that
allegedly  leaves  behind  various  forms  of  psychical  repression  or  old  ideological
partitions.  What  drives  all  this,  from  psychoanalytic-ethical  perspectives,  is  the
imperative  to  enjoy  from  the  superego,  as  is  the  uncanny,  obscene  double  of  the
prohibitory  Law  or  the  Name-of-the-Father.  However,  in  spite  all  the  images  of
satisfaction, enjoyment always eludes the subject’s full grasp and confronts the subject as
irreducible, unbearable Otherness: hence, anxiety that suffocates the subject. What really
troubles the subject is not so much the overproximity of the Big Brother’s panoptical gaze
as the prospect of not being exposed to the Other’s gaze enough (Žižek, “Neighbors” 180).
What moral lesson on contemporary society of enjoyment does The Truman Show enact, if
not the anxiety in question here? In the end of the film, Truman takes the “heroic” move
to leave all the simulated realities, he is still imagining a Beyond, the Other of the Other
and, hence, still falls prey to the superego imperatives to enjoy the (non-simulated, real)
Thing. The fantasmatic support of his desire, accordingly, remains intact. Besides, when
the superego no longer functions as the underside support of the Law but directly takes
the form of the explicit, excessive imperative, desire may be derailed or even come to its
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deadlock. To perceive what is at stake here, we only need to recall Lacan’s thesis that “the
more one sacrifices to [the superego],  the more it  demands” (Seminar VII 302).  From
Lacanian perspectives,  the  superego’s  functioning is  paradoxical,  split  in  nature:  the
moral  conscience  imposes the  prohibition  “No!”  on  the  subject,  while  the  former’s
obscene, perverted fantasmatic underside knows all the secrets of the latter’s jouissance
and commands it to enjoy/transgress more than it can bear: the subject always ends up
feeling guiltier for not enjoying enough. In the last analysis,  contemporary capitalist,
post-ideological society of enjoyment not only does not liberate desire but castrates the
subject more effectively than downright prohibitions and enslaves it in the superego’s
vicious circle more than ever. 
14 To learn the ultimate psychoanalytic-ethical lesson, namely, to recognize the death drive
as the real ground of ethics and politics, we need to think beyond all multiculturalist
ideological-ethical  falsifications to the extreme of  the inhuman,  which should not be
understood as the outside to the human but as more human than human or the human in
excess  of  itself. What  does  contemporary  multiculturalist,  relativist  ethical  ideology
according  to  Badiou’s  critique  amount  to,  if  not,  from  psychoanalytic-ethical
perspectives, hindering us from completing the authentic, radical ethical act in the way
that it turns us away from the Other’s or Neighbor-Thing’s radically inhuman excess and
monstrosity (Žižek, PV 342) and gentrify it with all the ethical imperatives, for example,
to respect the Other,  to answer the infinite calling from the Other,  or,  in a typically
Butlerian style, to acknowledge our limited knowing, “our shared, inevitable, and partial
blindness” (41), our opacity and our failure and to suspend judgment on the Other? The
radically real ground of ethics and politics from Badiouian perspectives supplemented by
the ultimate psychoanalytic-ethical lesson must be sought in the realm of the living dead,
of the Agambenian homo sacer, who, no longer covered by the Imaginary and Symbolic in
Lacanian  sense,  embodies  “the  zero-level  neighbor,  the  neighbor  with  whom  no
empathetic relationship is possible” (Žižek, “Neighbor” 161-62), the zero degree of social
existence between symbolic and real death (Santner 100; Žižek, TS 156), as the subject is
reduced to bare life and deprived of all the human markers, losing all the intersubjective,
symbolic bonds.
15 With above understanding in mind, we will not see anything viciously sarcastic in Žižek’s
claim that Agambenian homo sacer stands as the ideal bearer of universal human rights (
PV 340), as well as of our multiculturalist respect, tolerance and love. For Žižek, human
rights humanism elevates human subjects to their sublime essence through victimizing,
reducing  them to  a  form of  bare  life,  absolutely  passive  and  dispossessed,  awaiting
humanitarian intervention and redemption; human(itarian) subjects, in other words, are
split in themselves and never freed of their inhuman excess. To a great extent, Žižek’s
recent turn to the issue of the inhuman in ethics (or ethics of the inhuman?) simply
radicalizes his earlier conception of the identification with the symptom or excremental
identification, which amounts to “recogniz[ing] in the ‘excess,’ in the disruption of the
normal way of things, the key offering us access to its true functioning” (SOI 128). Such
recognition is equal to Lacanian subjective destitution according to Žižek’s formulation: 
The disavowed fundamental passivity of my being is structured in the fundamental
fantasy which… regulates the way I relate to jouissance. For that precise reason, it is
impossible for the subject to assume his fundamental fantasy without undergoing
the  radical  experience  of  “subjective  destitution”:  in  assuming my fundamental
fantasy, I take upon myself the passive kernel of my being – the kernel the distance
towards which sustains my subjective activity. (PF 116)
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16 The “passive kernel of my being” in question is the subject “subtracted from all form of
human individuality or personality” (VT xv), hence, the subject at its purest, the inhuman
excess of humanity, with which no empathetic, symbolic, or intersubjective relationship
is possible. All the typically Žižekian moves involved here, in the last analysis, clear the
ground  for  the  authentic  act  to  take  place,  with  the  violent  outcome  that  disrupts
normality, harmony, consensus, or the order of Being. 
17 Of course,  we should resist  taking passivity and subtraction at their surface value as
nothing but apathetic, quietist gestures. We must keep in mind that Žižek recent feverish
take on “Bartleby politics”, on how the refusal to choose turns to a radical gesture of
“passive aggression” (PV 342), goes along with his plea for ethico-political violence and
terror in rethinking radical politics. Standing diametrically against the multiculturalist,
postmodernist  ethics  and  politics,  Žižek,  once  again,  carries  his  earlier  notion  of
“identifying with the symptom” to its more radical possibility: to open up the conditions
for an authentic act to happen, we have to directly identify with violence and recognize
that  true universality,  as is  embodied by those “non-parts”  or  inhuman homo sacers,
comes  into  existence  in  the  guise  of  excessive,  irrational  violence  (PV 282,  TS 204).
Through  a  parallaxical  view,  such  violence  confronts  us  with  the  fundamental
antagonism in contemporary post-political, multiculturalist era, in which each and every
voice is supposed to be heard, and each and every part counted on condition that some
parts are not counted. In other words, Žižekian ethical violence disrupts the rules that
govern counting, recognition, “harmony” and “consensus,” as well as the parameters of
the possible and impossible. This also pertains to the divine violence that preoccupies
Žižek in his latest works. In order not to fall prey to obscurantist mystification and divert
our attention to an other-worldly unknowable origin,  we should have the courage to
equate the eruption of divine, ethical violence with the really existing historical events
when “those outside the structured social field strike ‘blindly’, demanding and enacting
immediate  justice/vengeance”  (VT x).  The  event  of  ethical  violence,  or  the  ethical
violence that happens, fundamentally disrupts the status quo. It is in such a moment that
the subject – properly speaking, the ethical, revolutionary subject – wagers an absolute
subtraction from the world of the living and all  social,  communitarian,  and symbolic
markers, proclaims its own death in advance, and loses the ground of its existence. This is
also the moment of emancipatory terror4 that suspends the functioning of the Law and
the subject’s enslavement by the superego injunctions to enjoy in contemporary society
of enjoyment as critiqued above. The subject thus heroically assumes “the solitude of a
sovereign decision… not covered by the big Other” (VT xi). 
18 To recapitulate: to radicalize his ethics and politics of the Truth-event, subtraction, and
universal singularity, Badiou needs to engage himself with, as a supplement to his own
work, the psychoanalytic-ethical lesson on the death drive. Meanwhile, the task at issue
not only opposes to contemporary multiculturalist  ethics against  violence but has to
identify itself with violence as well as terror so that subtraction and passivity will not
regress into self-marginalizing quietism. Perhaps, Badiou needs to go to the end of his
own thought and seriously confront the possibilities of ethical violence and emancipatory
terror. Žižekian ethical violence, put in summarily emphatic way, subtracts the subject
from the hegemonic ideological  field and destroys its  positive content;  the subject is
radically uprooted from its embedded environments (i.e. regime of opinions and force of
habits) or the ethics of finitude as critiqued earlier in this paper; it is brought to a state of
ontological dispossessedness or inhuman excess as presented above and the traumatic
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realization that there is no way back, what it is afraid to lose – ecological balance, social
harmony, life world, the substance of community or, in one word, the Other – has already
been lost (DLC 434), and it must be ready for the worst. Are we?
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NOTES
1. My own emphasis, hereafter cited as C. The abbreviations of the titles of Badiou’s works cited
in this paper include BE (Being and Event), E (Ethics), LW (Logics of Worlds), M (Metapolitics), SP (Saint
Paul), TW (Theoretical writings). For publications data, see Works Cited. 
2. Here after cited as TS. Other abbreviations of the titles of works by Žižek include DLC (In Defense
of Lost Causes), PF (Plague of Fantasies), PV (The Parallax View), SOI (The Sublime Object of Ideology), VT
(Virtue and Terror). For publications data, see Works Cited. 
3. The generic is one of the quadruple operations of subtraction at issue here. The undecidable
pertains  to  subtraction  from  the  norm  or  law,  the  event  as  unable  to  be  evaluated;  the
indiscernible  is  the  subject’s  subtraction  from  the  marking  of  sexual,  national,  or  ethnic
difference;  the  unnameable  designates  a  singularity  that  is  unable  to  be  singularized with  a
proper name. For more details, see “On Subtraction,” TW 105-20.
4. In  this  aspect,  Žižek gives  sufficient  credits  to  Badiou’s  call  for  reinventing emancipatory
terror today, though he problematizes Badiou’s defense of Terror in the French Revolution and
the  Maoist  Cultural  Revolution,  as  both,  according  to  Žižek,  foreclose  production  proper  by
reducing it to the political battle and come down to nothing but ideological displacement (PV
326, VT xxi-xxii). Such a critical reading also applies to Badiou’s recapitulation of terror in his
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recent Logics of Worlds  as “the projection onto the state of a subjective maxim, the egalitarian
maxim” (25), as remains confined by formalistic State politics.
ABSTRACTS
Alain Badiou’s coming to the forefront of the academic debates on the ontological status of Being,
political subjectivity, universality, and so on, deserves special attention in an age permeated by
disillusionment, cynicism, apathy, or “announcements of ending”: summarily, the post-political
age. This is also an age when “(hyper)connectivity” with and openness to the Other becomes the
dominant currency but radical politics and ethics reach their deadlock, if not demise. Drawing on
Badiou’s  conceptions  of  subtraction,  universal  singularity,  and the subject  loyal  to  the  truth
procedure, my proposed paper will critically look at whether contemporary multiculturalism and
“society of  enjoyment” end up at  nothing but relativist  ideology,  victimization of  man,  false
image of satisfaction and transgression, and, hence, submission to the status quo more than ever.
The final part will examine the possibility of supplementing Badiou’s universalizing project with
Žižek’s recent conceptualization of the inhuman and ethical violence and reinvigorating ethico-
politically authentic emancipatory thinking.
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